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THE SENSE OF JUSTICE AND THE JUSTICE OF SENSE:
NATIVE HAWAIIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE SECOND
"TRIAL OF THE CENTURY"
William H. Rodgers, Jr.*
The Congress... apologizes to Native Hawaiians on behalf of the
people of the United States for the overthrow of the Kingdom of
Hawaii on January 17, 1893 with the participation of agents and
citizens of the United States, and the deprivation of the rights of
Native Hawaiians to self-determination .
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1993, Congress apologized to the Native Hawaiians for the political
funny business of a century ago when the pineapple and sugar interests
overthrew the Kingdom of Hawaii with tactical help from U.S. officials.2
Another apology will be in order for an unconscionable political trial
now underway in the islands to punish one of the sovereignty leaders,
Dennis "Bumpy" Kanahele, for a variety of imagined offenses that
amount to the infliction of embarrassment on the U.S.
To put this essay in context, it should be understood, first of all, that
the struggle for Native Hawaiian lands and sovereignty is a longstanding
one, with more than the usual historical, political, and legal
complexities.3 It is accurate to say that Native Hawaiians today are
frequently "landless" in their own ancestral lands4 although a full
account defies a summary restatement.
* Professor of Law, University of Washington; George C. Johnson Visiting Professor of Law,
William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawai'i, Fall, 1995. This paper was originally
prepared for the "Sense of Justice" panel, Association for Advancement of American Science,
Baltimore, Md., February 9, 1996, organized by The Gruter Institute.
1. The Apology Bill to Native Hawaiians, Pub. L. No. 103-150, 107 Stat. 1510 (1993).
2. See S. Rep. No. 126, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1993).
3. See generally Michael Dougherty, To Steal A Kingdom (1992); David E. Stannard, Before the
Horror: The Population of Hawai'i on the Eve of Western Contact (1989); Mililani B. Trask,
Historical and Contemporary Hawaiian Self-Determination: A Native Hawaiian Perspective, 8 Ariz.
J. Int'l & Comp. L. 77 (1991).
4. See, e.g., Michael Kioni Dudley & Keoni Kealoha Agard, A Call for Hawaiian Sovereignty 1-
23, 64-71, 89-93 (1990); Native Hawaiian Rights Handbook 3-146 (Melody Kapilialoha Mackenzie
ed., 1991); Haunani-Kay Trask, Coalition-Building Between Natives and Non-Natives, 43 Stan. L.
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Not surprisingly, the federal courts in Hawaii frequently have been
drawn into these conflicts, often with unhappy consequences for the legal
positions advanced by Native Hawaiian advocates. To mention an
example, in the 1970s when the late George Boldt (federa.l district judge
in Tacoma, Washington) was enduring death threats and public
vilification to enforce the fishing rights of native Americans,' his
colleague on the federal district bench in Hawaii (Senior Judge Martin
Pence) was rushing to the aid of the sugar growers to protect their water
from being returned to native taro farmers under the controversial state
supreme court decision in McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson.6 By way of
further illustration, on November 3, 1995, the Ninth Circuit heard
argument on appeal from a decision by District Judge David Ezra who
ruled that the Pai 'Ohana (the Pai family), who had occupied a place on
the Kona Coast of the Big Island from time immemorial, had become
"tenants at sufferance" because their ancestors had failed to file for
Kuleana (fee simple) title during a brief window of opportunity that was
opened for the legally astute between 1848 and 1854." A "tenant at
sufferance" can be ousted at the whim of any landowner who feels like it,
so the Ezra decision must be recognized as a dangerous nd threatening
precedent for the 99-plus percentage of native land tenants in Hawaii
whose paperwork falls short of formal Kuleana title. Understandably, the
folks adversely affected might be expected not to soon forget decisions
of this ilk.
Dennis Kanahele, too, has not stood remote from the Hawaiian Native
sovereignty conflicts that have boiled over since Hawaii became a state
in 1959. It can be safely said that he has long been a thorn in the side the
state-federal establishment of Hawaii.! In 1987, he led a takeover of state
land at the Makapuu Point Lighthouse, claiming it to be the property of
the Native Hawaiian people. He was an outspoken member of the 'Ohana
Rev. 1197, 1198-1203 (1991); Bradley Hideo Keikiokalani Cooper, A Trust Divided Cannot
Stand-An Analysis of Native Hawaiian Land Rights, 67 Temp. L. Rev. 699 (1994).
5. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
6. 517 P.2d 26 (Haw. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 962, and cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
See Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp. 559, 56,--67 (D. Haw. 1977) (attacking, the McBryde Court
for its "completely revolutionary holdings" and "culinary creations," condemning the court's "sua
sponte" efforts to "completely restructure" state water law, and mocking the "speciousness" of its
reasoning: "It was strictly a 'public-policy' decision with no prior underlying 'legal' justification
therefor. The majority wanted to see streams running down to the sea on an all-year-around basis.").
7. Pai 'Ohana v. United States, 875 F. Supp. 680, 687, 695 (D. Haw. 1995).
8. The story is told in Plaintiff-Appellee's Memorandum in Support of the Delention Order at 2-8,
United States v. Kanahele (9th. Cir. Sept. 11, 1995) (C.A. No. 95-10373) [hereinafter U.S. Brief on
Appeal from Detention Order].
Vol. 71:379, 1996
Native Hawaiian Sovereignty
Council, one of the more militant arms of the Hawaiian sovereignty
movement. After the 1993 Apology Bill, he worked to set up the
Independent and Sovereign Nation State of Hawai'i that has its own
constitution with himself as the popularly chosen "head of state." Over
the years, he has encouraged Ghandi-like small disobediences, such as
the refusal to carry state-issued drivers' licenses or display state-issued
vehicle plates, that are widely practiced by Hawaiian sovereignty
advocates.
Kanahele and his supporters also have criticized federal judges, and
challenged them, which raises hard questions about the limits of political
debate in the United States today. Considerable official latitude, perhaps
too much, has been extended to the tough-talkers and bullies who have
become part of land-use debates in many parts of the West.9 The Branch
Davidians, the Unabomber, the Montana freemen, the Michigan Militia
and many others continuously push the legal envelope testing where talk
stops and crime begins. The law is forever exploring when insouciance
gives way to impudence that becomes insolence that leads to
insubordination that is meant to be intimidation, that is deservedly
treated as crime.
My approach in this Essay is to look at the conflict through a lens
suggested by evolutionary theory, sometimes described in the law
schools as "Law and Biology." In this world, the sense of justice is a set
of expectations about how others should behave, backed by a proclivity
towards moralistic aggression against deviators.'" The sense of justice
entails both cognition and emotion, with a match of expectations and
then the fit that follows if there is no fit. Compare and despair is the
name of the game."
9. See, e.g., David Foster, Sorting Tough Talkers from Terrorists, Seattle Times, April 18, 1995,
at AI; Paul de Armond, Wise Use in Northern Puget Sound 59 (1995) (reporting on tactics such as
"video-taping environmentalists, disrupting meetings with noisy livestock or heavy equipment, and
other methods of harassment and intimidation"); see also id. at 186 (reporting on enthusiastic
announcement of the Snohomish County Property Rights Alliance featuring an appearance by Dick
Carver, Nye County, Nevada, who "personally" drove a bulldozer into a road despite "forest service
orders to stop"); Timothy Egan, Federal Uniforms Become Target of Wave of Threats and Violence,
N.Y. Times, April 15, 1995, at Al.
10. Roger D. Masters, Toward a More Coherent Theory of Justice, in The Sense of Justice:
Biological Foundations of Law 290, 292 (Roger D. Masters & Margaret Gruter eds., 1992)
[hereinafter Sense of Justice]. See also Frans de Waal, Good Natured: The Origins of Right and
Wrong in Humans and Other Animals (1996).
11. See Masters, supra note 10, at 295 ("When there has been a departure from expected norms,
the emotions (anger, moralistic aggression) constitute a feeling of injustice, whereas compliance with
expectations and the restoration of previously established norms are associated with emotions of
pleasure or even euphoria underlying the sense ofjustice.").
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To elaborate somewhat on this evolutionary theory, the sources of the
expectations that drive the sense of justice are rooted in the social
system. Frans de Waal presents a strong case that the fbundations of
moralistic aggression among nonhuman primates stem from reciprocity
failures in one-to-one interactions.' Understandably, these, expectations
that prop up an emotionally laden apparatus of justice can be derived
from a variety of social considerations-status, in-group defense,
repeated defection by a member, misbehavior by peers, etc. The typical
courtroom, especially in an emotionally charged trial, offers a panorama
of justice checking-the prosecutor is searching for the proper measure
of contrition by the person charged, the defendant is hoping for divine
retribution against the informant, the judge has a sharp ear out for slurs
and slights coming from the defense table, defense lawyers are recalling
the last time this prosecutor did them in, defendant's family is looking
for a huge store of mercy (that is due to course) from Juror No. 7 who
was seen to smile in the hallway.
Understandably, this building up of expectations (and judgments also
about departures from them) can be influenced further by the twin
engines of deception and self-deception, both of which have deep roots
in evolutionary theory: 3 deception because actors in justice conflicts
must disguise unacceptable personal motivations as acceptable legal
norms; and self-deception because high uncertainties about motives and
future behavior of others must be interpreted as being coincident with the
professed aims of the enterprise. A prosecutor who has charged the crime
of treason is obliged to read ambiguous evidence as supporting the
charges.
II. POLITICAL TRIALS
A political trial, as the term is used here, requires punitive action by
the authorities to punish unpopular views of a politica'.ly prominent
defendant. Viewed through the lens of what we know about the sense of
12. Frans B.M. de Waal, The Chimpanzee's Sense of Social Regularity and Its Relations to the
Human Sense of Justice, in Sense of Justice, supra note 10, at 241, 242, 248; see also Michael T.
McGuire, Moralistic Aggression, Processing Mechanisms, and the Brain: The Biological
Foundations of the Sense of Justice, in Sense of Justice, supra, at 31, 32 (Rcger D. Masters &
Margaret Gruter eds., 1992).
13. William H. Rodgers, Jr., Deception, Self-Deception, and Myth: Evalu'ating Long-Term




justice, we would expect political trials to present special difficulties at
three levels: the charges, the proof, and the conduct of the trial.
In developing the charges, the prosecution has the problem of
identifying crime (reserved for gross departures from social norms) from
a variety of other status-offending, reciprocity-upsetting behaviors that
will spark the moralistic retaliation that will play itself out in the criminal
law arena. Was it a Police Academy movie where the question was
asked, "What is the crime?" and the sheriff answered, "Pissing me off"?
That's a nice account of motivation; but it leaves something to be desired
in most legal forums.
Since all states presume the importance of self-perpetuation (and
express it through law), the charges in a political trial frequently focus on
convenient categories of interfering with the wheels of government or
other variations on "making life difficult" for the authorities. As a rule,
political defendants are not charged with murder, arson, or car theft.
They are charged with conspiracy, incitement to riot, interference with
the work of officers, or obstruction of justice. Only a few historians of
Hawaii now remember that at the turn of the century Queen Liliuokalani
was charged by the inaptly named "Republic of Hawai'i" not with
"treason" (attempting to overthrow the government) but "misprision" of
treason (some ill-defined form of seditious or disloyal conduct that
includes concealment of knowledge of those who are attempting to
overthrow the government).'4
The proof will present a special challenge in political trials because,
by definition, there is a sharp disparity between the motives of the
prosecution (retaliation against a political opponent, getting even for
offensive speech) and the hard-core particulars of the crime charged.
This mismatch in proof will be reflected in the conduct of the trial
because there are substantial differences between the scope of the case as
perceived by prosecution and defense, and these differences will force
the court into repeated rulings that only can generate growing
dissatisfaction in the minds of the losers.
This Essay will focus on the social origins of the expectations that
drive this sense of justice, emphasizing (1) in-group solidarity, (2) status,
(3) the bounds of socially acceptable communication--herein of threats,
and (4) reciprocity and reputation damage.
14. Jon M. Van Dyke & Paula Henderson, The Trial of Lili'uokalani, February 1895, in Trial of a
Queen: 1895 Military Tribunal I (Jud. History Ctr., Hawai'i State Jud. ed., 1995) [hereinafter Trial
of a Queen].
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III. THE CASE OF UNITED STATES V. DENNIS "BUMPY"
KANAHELE: A LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY 5
On August 2, 1995, the defendant Kanahele was indicted (together
with co-defendant Gordon Kaaihue) and charged by a District of Hawaii
grand jury with interfering with a police officer, a misdemeanor; and two
felonies-harboring a fugitive and interfering with a United States
Marshal while he was engaged in his official duty. 6 Kanahele was held
for three and a half months without bail, and eventually was brought to
trial before District Judge Helen Gillmor. 7 A mistrial was declared on
October 31, 1995 (Halloween), amidst newspaper speculation about
"jury misconduct" and even "tampering," as one of the jurors fell victim
to the belief that a little independent research on the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment was bound to be an improvement on anything he was
likely to hear from the presiding judge. 8 Subsequently, after 118 days in
prison, Kanahele was released on bail by order of District Judge David
Ezra.'9 Government prosecutors have expressed an intention to seek
convictions at a new trial in 1996.20
15. The author attended significant portions of the trial and hearings arising out of the case.
Unless otherwise noted, what follows is based on notes taken from personal observations of those
and related events.
16. Indictment, United States v. Kanahele (D. Haw. Aug. 2, 1995) (CR. No. 95..00764).
17. See Order Affirming Magistrate Judge's Detention Order, United States v. Kanahele (D. Haw.
Aug. 21, 1995) (CR. No. 95-00764) (affirming detention-without-bail order of Aug. 7, 1995)
[hereinafter Order Affirming Magistrate Judge's Detention Order]. Kanahele was held from the date
of his arrest on August 2, 1995, see id. at 2, until his release in mid-November after Judge Helen
Gillmor declared a mistrial, see Linda Hosek, Judge Sets Kanahele "Free with a Short Leash",
Honolulu Star-Bull., Nov. 14, 1995, at Al.
18. See Mark Matsunaga & Ken Kobayashi, Turmoil Surrounds Kanahele Vistrial, Honolulu
Advertiser, Nov. 1, 1995, at Al, A2.
19. See Hosek, supra note 17, at Al.
20. See Matsunaga & Kobayashi, supra note 18, at Al. Kanahele's attorney, Hayden Aluli,
submitted a motion to have the charges dismissed on double jeopardy grounds. Judge Gillmor
rejected the motion and Kanahele has appealed that decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
See Order Denying Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss the Indictment with Prejudice, United
States v. Kanahele (D. Haw. Jan. 22, 1996) (CR. No. 95-00764 HG). A second :rial is pending the
decision of the appeals court. Linda Hosek, New Kanahele Trial Postponed Until Ruling by
Appellate Court, Honolulu Star-Bull., April 23, 1996, reprinted at
http://www.aloha.net/nation/postponed.html.
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IV. SOCIAL DEFECTIONS: SOURCES OF EXPECTATIONS
A. The Question of In-Group Solidarity: Defection and Disloyalty
Kanahele, it seems, has made several mistakes that have attracted the
moralistic aggression of the federal prosecutors, and none of them relate
directly to the charges brought against him.
The first is an enthusiastic reading of the famous 1993 Congressional
"Apology Bill" (which acknowledges, after all, the "illegal overthrow"
of the Kingdom of Hawaii and expresses regret for "the deprivation of
the rights of Native Hawaiians to self-determination"), construed by
Kanahele to be the justification for the Independent and Sovereign
Nation State of Hawai'i that has been set up with its own constitution
and himself as the popularly chosen "head of state." That Kanahele takes
this position partly on the basis of legal advice (international law expert
Prof. Francis A. Boyle) ironically gives his group the same legal veneer
("lawyer approved")2 that large corporations hide behind every day of
the year. On the street, this belief in independence led Kanahele to tell
his arresting officer, "I must notify you that I am the 'Head of State of
the Nation of Hawaii;"' and that "I do not recognize your jurisdiction
over me;" and that "if anyone should be under arrest, it is you for your
war crimes and the overthrow of the Hawaiian government."
22
John Hartung, among others, has elaborated upon the strikingly
different moral calculus humans apply to in-group as opposed to out-
21. See generally Affidavit of Francis A. Boyle, October 20, 1995, at http://www.hawaii-
nation.org/boyleaff.html (providing brief history of how Professor Boyle came to serve as "Legal
Adviser to the Nation of Hawaii" and stating that Professor Boyle provided "legal advice and
counsel to Mr. Kanahele and the citizens of the Nation of Hawaii concerning the establishment of
their state"); Francis A. Boyle, Restoration of the Independent Nation State of Hawaii Under
International Law, 7 St. Thomas L. Rev. 723 (1995) (analyzing the Apology Bill and concluding that
the legitimacy of Hawaiian sovereignty claims are one of the bill's implications); Professor Believes
U.S. Apology Gives Hawaiians Right to Nationhood, Maui Press, January 14-20, 1994, reprinted at
http:llwww.aloha.netlnationlprofapology.html (describing Professor Boyle's views on Hawaiian
sovereignty). Cf Jennifer M.L. Chock, One Hundred Years of Illegitimacy: International Legal
Analysis of the Illegal Overthrow of the Hawaiian Monarchy, Hawai'is Annexation, and Possible
Reparations, 17 U. Haw. L. Rev. 463 (1995) (arguing that the U.S. violated international law when it
participated in deposing Queen Liliuokalani and that monetary reparations to Native Hawaiians are
appropriate); Francis A. Boyle, American Foreign Policy Toward International Law and
Organizations:1898-1917, 6 Loy. L.A. Int'l Comp. L.J. 185 (1983) (tracing themes in U.S. foreign
policy and detailing U.S. recognition of international law during the period between 1898-1917).
22. U.S. Brief on Appeal from Detention Order, supra note 8, at 9.
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group members.' Kanahele's declaration of independence, is as good a
way as any to effect a separation from the group, and that separation will
strip the offender of many legal benefits of the doubt. This interpretation
is confirmed by the government's briefs in the case, which bristle with
moral indignation, describing the organization as a "cult," and a "so-
called" sovereignty group; its place of business as a "remote rural
compound" that is "rumored to be fortified;" its members as "followers"
and "subjects;" and Kanahele himself as "volatile and dangerous." 24
Kanahele's independence cost him dearly when he carne to court. In
his August 7, 1995 decision denying bail, Magistrate District Judge
Barry M. Kurren adroitly turned Kanahele's political beliefs against him.
The findings in the Order of Detention Pending Trial are that "defendant
denies the jurisdiction of the court and there is no basis to believe that he
will abide by any lawful order of the court;" and that "[t]he nature of the
charges and evidence at the hearing are evidence of the defendant's
strongly held conviction to ignore the order of the court."25 Worse,
defendant could not undo the damage caused by his political philosophy
by statements and proof that he would appear for trial.
On appeal, U.S. Attorney Leslie Osborne extended the argument: a
defendant "can not claim strong ties to a community whose laws he
repudiates and whose court he openly disdains."26 This is the defection-
from-the-community theory in full bloom. Its implications are clear:
"You have left us and we have no reason to expect your cooperation in
any future legal proceeding; if you subscribe to Hawaiian Sovereignty,
by definition you do not believe in U.S. Sovereignty; therefore, all
Hawaiian Sovereignty advocates charged with crimes in the U.S. courts
must be held without bail."
Of course, the "strongly held" beliefs in the lack of federal jurisdiction
that sufficed to keep the defendant locked up without bail suddenly
didn't matter when it came to defense at trial. No state is sympathetic to
jurisdictional challenges by those who think some other sovereign should
be in charge.
23. John Hartung, Love Thy Neighbor: The Evolution of In-Group Morality, S (eptic, No. 4, 1995,
at 86; Gary R. Johnson, The Evolutionary Roots of Patriotism, in Patriot,'sm in the Life of
Individuals and Nations (D. Bar-Tal & E. Staub eds., forthcoming 1996).
24. U.S. Brief on Appeal from Detention Order, supra note 8, at 2, 5-8.
25. Order of Detention Pending Trial at 1, United States v. Kanahele (D. Haw. Aug. 7, 1995) (CR.
No. 95-00764).




In repeated rulings, Judge Gillmor confirmed the expectation in
"political" cases that the court's tight control of the legal agenda will be
a source of constant friction. The defense was not allowed to pursue the
claim of selective prosecution, which shut off all inquiry into the
retaliatory motives that fueled this case.27 The question of sovereignty
was foreclosed. As one observer put it, "The 'S' word was a 'question of
law,' not 'a matter of facts, '28 and this meant that Professor Boyle, who
had guided Kanahele on his course of legal independence, could not
testify. Kanahele's good-faith beliefs were out of bounds too so that this
man who worked his "harboring" and "obstructing" under cover of the
Congressional Apology Bill had to pay the price for any mistakes.
Surprisingly, trial Judge Gillmor ruled that Kanahele could claim no
"self defense" for standing his ground when unidentified agents swooped
down on his home in pursuit of fugitive Nathan Brown (more about this
later). That ruling, in all likelihood, is an error of law29 (not to mention
an encroachment on the sense of justice) and may have been the last
straw that drove one of the jurors to the law library in a vain search for
some legal direction he could trust.
Two other factors tend to drive political trials like this one to unhappy
conclusions. One is the element of momentum (sometimes called the
sunk-cost factor), which makes it difficult for the prosecuting enterprise
to turn away from the leaps of faith or displays of loyalty that get the
case going in the first place. The principal participants in the prosecution
27. Based on author's observations.
28. Sondra Grace, Kanahele's Trial Is in Defense ofAll Rights, Kauai Times, Nov. 8, 1995, at A7
(providing first-hand observations on trial in opinion page essay).
29. Cf 18 U.S.C. § 111 (1994) ("Whoever forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes,
intimidates, or interferes with any person designated in section 1114 of this title while engaged in or
on account of the performance of official duties ... shall ... be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than one year, or both."). Generally, knowledge of the identity of a federal officer is
unnecessary for a conviction under § I 1l. United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671 (1975). However, the
Feola Court also said:
We are not to be understood as implying that the defendant's state of knowledge is never a
relevant consideration under § 11l. The statute does require a criminal intent, and there may
well be circumstances in which ignorance of the official status of the person assaulted or
resisted negates the very existence of mens rea. For example, where an officer fails to identify
himself or his purpose, his conduct in certain circumstance might reasonably be interpreted as
the unlawful use of force directed either at the defendant or his property. In a situation of that
kind, one might be justified in exerting an element of resistance, and an honest mistake of fact
would not be consistent with criminal intent.
Id. at 686. See also United States v. Span, 75 F.3d 1383, 1388 (9th Cir. 1996) (adopting the holding
of Feola in a jury instruction). For one version of the Kanahele incident, see Vin Suprynowicz,




enterprise (prosecutors, judges, witnesses) were directly involved in the
early bail proceeding, and it was impossible to admit later that the flight
risk presented by this defendant was nonexistent and the danger to the
community strictly fictitious.
On top of this, the "us vs. them" atmosphere of the political trial puts
severe pressure on the lawyers and judges alike to show their
institutional loyalty. The danger here is that these institutional
commitments can lead to a proceeding where conviction is the only
possible outcome. In the Kanahele case, these institutional factors were
accelerated by the particular personalities of U.S. Attorney Leslie
Osborne and presiding judge Helen Gillmor. Osborne is a very tough
prosecutor, quick to attack, strutting with self confidence, prone to
sarcasm. Gillmor is a very new judge, uncomfortable before the jury,
fearful of losing control, uncertain of her rapport with the prosecutor and
the defense. The combination was unfortunate, as the prosecutor was
quick to object and the court quicker yet to sustain. The "sustains" would
rush forth if the prosecutor objected, if he stood up contemplating an
objection, or if he stirred about showing discomfort with the line of
questioning. Gradually, the prosecution came to be treated with
ingratiating deference while the defense got a strong dose of impatience,
annoyance, condescension, preachiness, and scolding. The "sidebar,"
made infamous in the O.J. Simpson trial, made conspicuous appearance
again in the Kanahele trial, not unexpectedly, since it is the last resort of
an inexperienced judge forced to make rulings of a novel kind.
B. The Question of Status: the Lowered Gaze, the Shuffling Step
Kanahele's second transgression was to couple his declaration of
independence with a display of disdain for the presently constituted U.S.
authorities. It was this disregard of status and reverential debate that
unleashed an avalanche of federal legal retaliation against him. The
criminal charges against Kanahele came over a year and a half after the
incidents took place but within weeks after the federal and state judges in
Hawaii were served papers by the Nation of Hawai'i pu.tting them on
notice for ongoing human rights violations against the Native Hawaiian
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Marshal seeks to arrest Nathan Brown at
Kanahele's home but Brown escapes.
Felonies: Harboring a fugitive, and
interfering with a U.S. Marshal while he is






Marshal Anne Kent meets with
Kanahele to attempt to obtain
admissions about earlier
incidents.
One of the notices served on United States District Court Magistrate
Barry M. Kurren, for example, stated that "you have made [yourself]
personally liable for war crimes" and "crimes against humanity;" your
acts "show contempt" towards the Kanaka Maoli People [Native
Hawaiians]; service of this document "is prima facie evidence of your
full knowledge and participation in the direct murder and extermination
of the Kanaka Maoli People and their Government;" recipients were
advised that they could be arrested and "imprisoned" and "brought
before" an "international Criminal Tribunal to answer for your
participation in crimes of Apartheid and Genocide;" and the punch line:
"There will be no appeal," and "Judgment will be final."3 These notices
of human rights violations were written and signed not by Kanahele but
by Maltbie Napoleon, the "Attorney General" of the Nation of Hawai'i,
who was to appear later as a witness for the defense at Kanahele's trial.
There is a crime of threatening the safety of public officials, but these
notices don't establish it. For a conviction on this score it is necessary to
establish explicit threats and overt acts to distinguish criminal
undertakings from free speech.3' In these days of anti-government
30. War Crimes Notice signed by Maltbie Napoleon, Hawai'i Attorney General (June 20, 1995).
See infra Appendix.
31. 18 U.S.C. § 876 (1994) prohibits mailing a letter "containing ... any threat to injure the
person of the addressee." Under § 876:
[The government] must present evidence sufficiently strong to establish beyond a reasonable
doubt that the communication in question conveys a threat of injury. Where a communication
contains language which is equally susceptible of two interpretations, one threatening, and the
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backlash and tough talk, federal officials routinely turn a deaf ear to
criticism, abuse, and other displays of unhappiness that make "war
crimes notices" seem like so many letters to the editor. Indeed, virtually
all of the officials who received the "notices" of the Nation of Hawai'i
shrugged them off as just another ripple in the tide of public discussion.
But nobody talks to federal judges in this tone. Threats of arrest,
references to "war crimes" and "judgment will be final" is not the kind of
discussion they are accustomed to hearing. They don't like to be accused
of something the Nazis did, especially when the parallels are not
glaringly obvious. And the "judgment will be final" reference has an
ominous ring to it, particularly if inte.preted in the worst imaginable light
of the assassinations, clinic bombings, and nerve gas attacks that
dominate the nightly news. Senior Judge Samuel King of the District of
Hawaii expressed this opinion in June of 1995 when he described the
notices he had received from the Nation of Hawai'i as unacceptable and
threatening. 2 This is where the Kanahele case should have ended--talk
against talk, speech against speech.
That it didn't end here says something about the federal courts as an
institution. Federal district judges are among the most pampered,
protected, and revered of any elite in human history. They ai:e appointed
for life, move in distinguished company, and are answerabl,. to nobody
unless one reckons casual appeals processes that might uncover "error"
within the normal two to three years' span of lawyers' time. They are
served by a retinue of clerks, secretaries, and bailiffs. People rise when
they walk into the room. As a rule, federal judges are immune from
criticism. Lawyers learn to keep their mouths shut out of ethical
necessity or a practical account of tomorrow's prospects when they
confront this judge again. To the media and the public, judicial
decisionmaking is a technical thing, like searching for a heart murmur,
and thus judges customarily escape the criticisms and inquiries that go to
their less immunized colleagues on the planning commission or in the
state legislature. Actually, political and ideological tests always have
been strong for acceptance into the exclusive club of the federal
judiciary, and they have become intensely so since the Reagan years.
other nonthreatening, the government carries the burden of presenting evidence to remove that
ambiguity.
United States v. Barcley, 452 F.2d 930, 933 (8th Cir. 1971).
32. See Mark Matsunaga, Nation of Hawaii Warns U.S., State Judges, Honolulu Advertiser, June




Federal judges get their authority by surviving close political scrutiny
and exercise it by pretending they are not political decisionmakers.
Offending judges is not a crime of course, but it is a way to stir
resentments and freshen memories of other wrongs long since past. The
charges against Kanahele and his co-defendant Kaaihue grew out of two
botched attempts by the authorities to arrest tax protester and sovereignty
activist Nathan Brown on January 27 and March 16, 1994. Fugitive
Brown was long gone (he had not been seen for over a year) and the
circumstances of his escape had been consigned to the dustbins of old
business. But the policy of official forbearance came to a sudden end
when the Nation of Hawai'i provoked the law enforcement apparatus
with its "war crimes notices" campaign, and unleashed the unhappy
memories of a Nathan Brown gone for good. In short order, the federal
Club Honolulu went to work, in the form of thin-skinned federal judges,
compliant U.S. attorneys, a dutiful FBI, and a scheming U.S. Marshal's
office.
The low point in this campaign to stalk the defendants anew was a
meeting between the Kanahele group and the U.S. Marshals on June 13,
1995," 3 called by the Nation of Hawai'i to dispel suspicions that they
were hiding fugitives (such as the notorious Jack Gonzalez34 and the
elusive Nathan Brown), gathering arms, and preparing for some sort of
"Waco" confrontation. One cannot hear an account of this meeting
without thinking of President Grover Cleveland's reference to the United
States's shameful exploitation of a "friendly and confiding" people that
has marked the history of the islands.35 Marshal Anne Kent's treacherous
mission at this June 13 meeting was to extract from Kanahele damaging
admissions that in the past he had intended to prevent the authorities
from arresting Brown. The warnings that one reads about in the
lawbooks (e.g., "anything you say can be used against you," etc.) don't
apply because Kanahele hadn't been arrested yet, although that clearly
was the plan. Anne Kent did succeed in coaxing from Kanahele a
comment the gist of which was: "You put your hand on my gate, I move
your hand. You come through my gate, or into my yard, I'll knock you
down."36 In Idaho, remarks like this are evidence of red-blooded
33. The account of this meeting is based upon the notes of the author, drawn from the account of
several witnesses.
34. U.S. Brief on Appeal from Detention Order, supra note 8, at 2 n.3. See also A. Kam Napier,
The House that Jack Built, Honolulu, November 1995, at 68 (providing a history of Gonzalez's legal
troubles).
35. Dudley & Agaard, supra note 4, at 42.
36. U.S. Brief on Appeal from Detention Order, supra note 8, at 8.
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American spunkiness. In Hawaii, they are an admission of an intent to
obstruct justice.
At the June 13, 1995 meeting Anne Kent went so far as to say to
Kanahele: "Repeat after me: I, Dennis Kanahele, [pledge that I will not]
invite Nathan Brown into my home if he is cold and hungry [and in the
greatest of need]. 37 Michael McGuire reminds us tha: status among
primates requires frequent reinforcement, 3 and here is a nice example. In
the campaign against Kanahele, a number of offic:Ials repeatedly
demanded from him the respect they were due--the police, the marshals,
the judges among them. After 118 days in prison and one mistrial,
Kanahele was more than anxious to give them the assurances they
wanted-no objections to jurisdiction, pledges of nonviolence, promises
of future cooperation, and commitments to desist from the service of
notices of human rights violations.
Judge David Ezra's decision from the bench on November 27 finally
releasing Kanahele was a triumphant reaffirmation of :Federal judicial
authority over its humble but grateful subjects. The scene was suggestive
of the highly paternalistic tradition established under martial law in the
"Republic of Hawaii" where oppressive sentences were dispensed, only
to be relaxed later in a great showing of official magnanimity. 39 There
were no apologies or regrets to Kanahele for the lost four months. There
was mention of the recent assassination of the Prime Minister of Israel by
a true believer. There was reference to the "serious" nature of the crime
of obstruction of justice, and how under the ancient Hawaiian "kapu"
system one would "defy" the chiefs only at risk of death. There was
repeated talk of the government's "concern" for the safety of law
enforcement officers and how Kanahele had many "f~ollowers" and
"supporters" who may be "more zealous than you are." Thus Kanahele
was free to go, but he was warned against "inciting criminal conduct,"
which is another one of those criminal laws that is marvelously
responsive to discretionary anxiety.
37. Based upon author's recollection of witness accounts.
38. M. McGuire et al., Social Dominance in Adult Male Vervet Monkeys: General
Considerations, 22 Soc. Sci. Information 89, 90 (1983). See also Frans de Waal, Peacemaking
Among Primates 157-60 (1989) (describing status rituals of rhesus and stumptail macaques); Frans
de Waal, Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals (1996).
39. Jon Kamakawiwo'ole Osorio, A Hawaiian Nationalist Commentary on the Trial of the Mo7
Wahine, in Trial of a Queen, supra note 14, at 29, 34-39 (listing persons accused of treason and
misprision of treason in the 1895 trials; many of the sentences were in exces:s of five years, with
some extending thirty to thirty-five years, but all offenders had been released by Jan. 1, 1896).
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C. The Question of Threat: The Role of Self-Deception
Physical intimidation of another person has to be one of the most
efficient ways to start the moralistic retaliation associated with the sense
of justice. The only worse offense would be threats that encompass
individuals and family. The awkward genius of the war crimes notices
campaign of the Nation of Hawai'i was that it could be perceived as
accomplishing both goals simultaneously-threatening the physical
safety of individual judges and the collective enterprise of law
enforcement. This transgression, so construed, requires decisive
countermeasures.
The evidence that succeeded in imprisoning Kanahele for four months
occurred not at trial but at his bail hearing where a decision is supposed
to be made about whether the defendant is a flight risk or a threat to the
safety of the community before he is tried. It is hard not to be released on
bail. The Menendez brothers are strong candidates for bail. In the course
of their careers, Manson and Bundy got out on bail. If they have some
ties to the community, people charged with murder, robbery, and rape
routinely get out on bail.
But Kanahele, the man recognized as one of the five or six leading
figures in the Hawaiian sovereignty movement? No way; he was a flight
risk and a "danger" to the safety of the community. The "evidence" on
this score was an impressive accumulation of hearsay (which is allowed
in proceedings of this sort), gossip, rumor, and fantasy supporting the
official prediction that Kanahele would either flee or beat somebody up
before he was brought to trial A bail hearing is an ideal forum for
reducing the government's worst fears to fact.
The government's proof at the pre-bail phase of the case shows
considerable skill in enhancing the scope of the threat (that is, "we are all
in this together") and its credibility. Thus, the defendant has shown
"disdain" for law enforcement, has "stridently denounced" the
jurisdiction of the federal court, has "actually threatened" to arrest state
and federal officers, has "[harassed] the judiciary and [shows] contempt
for legal authority," has told arresting officers that they lack jurisdiction
over him, has a "strongly held conviction to ignore any order of the
court," has "threatened state judges, federal judges, and law enforcement
officers," and "has even had the audacity to threaten the U.S. Marshal
with the District of Hawaii with physical violence."4
40. U.S. Brief on Appeal from Detention Order, supra note 8,passim.
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The credibility of the threat is enhanced in argumentation by inflating
the danger posed by the offender. Thus defendant has a "long criminal
history," has lived a "life of crime and anti-social behavior,"'" has used
six aliases (two of those listed are alternative spellings of his nickname:
"Bumby" and "Bumpie"), has an extensive rap sheet that includes a long
list of offenses, including criminal contempt, driving wih a suspended
license, trespass, criminal trespass, resisting arrest, criminal property
damage.42 Incredibly, the man has three felony convictions (use of a gun,
terroristic threatening, resisting arrest):
[The convictions stem from] an illegal occupation of state land at
the Makapuu Point Lighthouse. The defendant and others had
settled on State property and claimed it as their own. The State of
Hawaii, Department of Land and Natural Resources had called
upon the Honolulu Police Department to evict the trespassers. The
trespassers and this defendant simply refused to obey law
enforcement officers who were in the lawful discharge of their
duty.
43
From the depths of historical political conflict thus emerges a reputation
for violence, which will loom large in later legal proceedings.
Once government agents convince themselves that this is a violent
man charged with violent crimes, argumentation can proceed within the
limits of imagination while deception/self-deception is given full sway.
The government "proof' of threats to the physical safety of judges and
police officers need not be limited to the innocuous notices of violation
but can include wild rumors about associations with militia madmen,
subtle hints about a weapons buildup at Weimanalo (the place is
"rumored to be fortified to some extent")," and identification of
symptomatic incidents of civil disobedience that must be nipped in the
bud. Judge Gillmor's decision affirming Magistrate Kurren's detention
order denying bail to Kanahele shows how the legal system tolerates
self-deceptions that masquerade as reality:
The magistrate judge declined to consider evidence that the Nation
of Hawaii has had contacts with the Michigan Militia, that its
members are storing arms and ammunition in former World War II
41. Id. at 3, 5.
42. See Pretrial Services Report, United States v. Kanahele (D. Haw. Aug 4, 1995) (No. 95-
00764HG-01) at 2, 3 (recommending against bail).
43. U.S. Brief on Appeal from Detention Order, supra note 8, at 4.
44. Id. at 6.
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bunkers in Weimanalo, and that on September 24, 1993, 25 to 30
members of an affiliated group, the "Ohana Council for the
Hawaiian Kingdom", disrupted a state court hearing on the island
of Hawaii, refused to leave the courtroom and prevented the judge
and staff from exiting the courthouse.45
This is an example of what might be called a footnoted version of
nonverbal communication and signaling.46 What is meant by the message
is that reviewing judges should understand that the Nation of Hawai'i is
very likely a gun-toting cult of Waco terrorists but it would be a
reversible legal error to insist on the truth of that proposition for the
moment.
Another version of judicial signaling was occasioned by the fact that
Magistrate Judge Barry M. Kurren, the original decisionmaker who
denied Kanahele's bail motion on August 4, 1995, was the unhappy
recipient of one of the Nation's war crimes notices and had gone so far as
to state at the detention hearing his agreement with Judge King's opinion
that the notices constitute a "threat" against duly constituted authority.
47
The legal difficulty is that a judge who is threatened by a defendant
could be thought to have a "personal bias or prejudice" that would
require some other judge to sit in judgment.
This "fear" was not considered by Judge Kurren to be sufficiently
disabling to prevent him from reaching a fair decision, and he did so by
denying all bail and effectively insuring Kanahele's incarceration for the
next four months. This ruling by Judge Kurren was later affirmed by
Judge Gillmor (a new appointee obviously feeling her way gingerly in
the world of judicial politics), and then affirmed again by a 2-1 vote of a
three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit.48 Judge Gillmor explained why
45. Order Affirming Magistrate Judge's Detention Order, supra note 17, at 4 n.2.
46. Nonverbal communication is a substantial subject in evolutionary biology. See, e.g., William
H. Calvin, The Ascent of Mind: Ice Age Climates and the Evolution of Intelligence 23-25 (1990);
P.B. Medawar & J.S. Medawar. Aristotle to Zoos: A Philosophical Dictionary of Biology 170 (1983)
(on the origins of language). See also Matt Ridley, The Red Queen: Sex and the Evolution of Human
Nature 332-34 (1994) (on the elements of deception in communication). The example in the text is
an illustration of"coded" communication-saying one thing and meaning another. This writer would
be surprised if this is not a phenomenon that is observable in judicial behavior.
47. U.S. Brief on Appeal from Detention Order, supra note 8, at 13-14.
48. One of the votes for keeping Kanahele locked up came from Alfred T. Goodwin of Pasadena
who is best known in the islands for his dreadful ruling in the 1980s forbidding the Hawai'i Supreme
Court from divesting sugar companies of their "vested" water rights. Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 753 F.2d
1468, 1475 (9th Cir. 1983). Divesting Kanahele of his freedom is a much more discretionary thing.
Curiously, one measure of good judging today is the ability to defer to the foolishness of the
authorities whose judgment is contested.
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the formal law did not require the disqualification of Kurren: "Magistrate
Judge Kurren's characterization of the Notice as a 'threat' was an
objective assessment of the intent of its sender. This comment was not an
acknowledgment that the magistrate judge subjectively felt threatened or
an indication that the Notice compromised his impartiality. '49 Thus the
"threats" lurking in the deep background of the war crimes notices were
sufficiently credible to keep Kanahele locked up but not real enough to
disqualify the judges who were hearing the case.
At trial, the illusory nature of these "threats" against public officers
was brought into sharp focus. The principal charges dealt with
Kanahele's attempts on two separate occasions to interfere with the arrest
of Nathan Brown. Nathan Brown must be one of the most casually
pursued fugitives in the history of federal jurisprudence. Rarely has a
man been so vulnerable to arrest but so immune from it. He moved freely
about the community. He lived on the beach. He did research in the law
library. He testified at public hearings.
Occasionally, somebody would try to arrest him but not with much
enthusiasm. On January 27, 1994, the "fugitive" Nathan Brown testified
at a water commission hearing in Waihole in full view of ten or twelve
police officers" who must have been deterred from their mission by the
eloquence of his remarks. This man was begging to be arrested but it
never quite happened. The "arrest," such as it was, occurred on the
Kamehameha highway that evening as the three vehicles in the Kanahele
party (with men, women, and children) were pulled over by several
police vehicles. The arrest was announced by one of the officers who
rushed up to the vehicle carrying Brown, declined by Brown ("I can't go
with you Bro"), and eventually was resolved by Browr's agreeing to
show up for a meeting a few days hence (which he never did attend).
One officer later testified that it was "not prudent" to press the issue
because there were "six of us" and "eighteen or twenty of them" (which
drew groans in the courtroom because most of the "thems" were women
and children plus some bystanders drawn to the scene by the flashing
lights on the police vehicles).
The sole evidence of "obstruction" against Kanahele',s co-defendant
Kaaihue that night is that he stood by during the conversations with
Brown, perhaps with his chest "puffed out" according to prosecutor
Osborne (more chortles from the gallery on this one). The reason that the
49. Order Affirming Magistrate Judge's Detention Order, supra note 17, at 8-9.
50. The account in the next several paragraphs is based upon the author's personal notes and
observations. It has not been verified by reference to the official transcript.
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image of Gordon Kaaihue with his chest "puffed out" brings instant
mirth is that he is a giant of a man, with a classical Hawaiian physique,
who could dispose of a dozen assailants if they chose to go unarmed. As
Kaaihue said simply at trial, "God blessed me with a nice body." Having
a nice body, it seems, becomes "obstruction of justice" at the discretion
of the United States.
Kanahele's "interference" during this January 27, 1994 incident
consisted chiefly of serving the officers with copies of the 1993 Apology
Bill and other documents. Again, the awesome job of arresting Nathan
Brown might have been easier without the presence of Kanahele and the
bulky Kaaihue, not to mention the crying children, the flashing lights,
and the rubbernecking bystanders. Detecting an "interference" here with
an arrest that was abandoned as a bad job is a reach of the lowest kind,
and it shows the ease with which prosecutors can manufacture crimes out
of thin air.
For the 'next several weeks, Nathan Brown continued to move freely
about town where he could have been arrested hundreds of times by
scores of officers. But this slow motion hot pursuit could end at only one
place-Kanahele's doorstep in Waimanalo. On March 16, 1994, two
federal marshals dressed in plain clothes who were staking out the place
spotted Brown and Kanahele in a vehicle approaching the property. A
fair summary of events is that the officers rushed to arrest Brown, who
ran into the carport, across the property, never to be seen again. Marshal
Lawrence Tice testified that he "collided" with Kanahele, who said,
"Who the hell are you?," and "You can't be here. This is Hawaiian
land;" that Kanahele told a woman (his sister) on the property to
"padlock the gate" and "call the boys;" that "five minutes later I told him
[Kanahele] who I was;" that he, Tice, said to Kanahele that a "fugitive
has just gone across your property;" that Kanahele announced that
"Nathan Brown is not subject to the laws of the U.S." and that "we were
violating the law and were subject to arrest;" that Kanahele had given
them copies of the Apology Bill, and that Tice had responded, "We're
not here to argue sovereignty;" and that after a short passage of time,
Kanahele had invited the Marshals onto the property to search for
Brown, but that they declined on the supposition that he would not be
there.
Once again, it is hard to detect any crime arising out of this little
m~l~e, unless it is one with regard to Brown whose debt to society
increases with each fresh escape. Constitutional scholars might speculate
on how ancient Hawaiian notions of "refuge" (which offered safe harbor
to fugitives who could make it to the protected places) might qualify the
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federal law on harboring fugitives.5 Before that, one wonders what
degree of aid and assistance must be rendered a fugitive to constitute
"harboring": A short lift in an automobile? A cup of hot coffee? The
point of the crime obviously is to discourage rendering sustained aid and
assistance to enable somebody to escape from the authorities. 2 It is not
enough to know that "a fugitive has just gone across your property," to
use Marshal Tice's words.
Any "obstruction" charge based on these facts is a reach, too.
Kanahele, again, didn't do much, other than drawing the Apology Bill
from its accustomed resting place. The officers' credential; were in order
but the case is complicated by Kanahele's genuine telief that the
authorities lack jurisdiction on Hawaiian lands. (State of mind is always
the key question in criminal cases.) On top of this, the incident gives rise
to hard-core defense of person and property issues since nobody, even
law-abiding Hawaiians, can be expected to sit idly by while a couple of
rough-looking characters storm the place looking to seize a friend. 3 Had
Kanahele said he was defending "private property' rather than
"Hawaiian lands" perhaps a surge of official sympathy would have
conceded him the privilege of a little testiness in defense of boundary.
These two Nathan Brown nonincidents (the failed arrests of January
27, 1994 and of March 16, 1994) happen all the time in law enforcement
and they never make it to the prosecutor's desk, much less to the court
dockets. But Kanahele and Kaaihue were not to be the beneficiaries of
this usual fate of official forbearance. More than a year later the service
of the war crimes notices was the watershed event that revived the
prosecutor's interest in the case.
When Kanahele came up for his second try for bail on November 27,
1995 before Judge David Ezra, after 118 days in jail, U.S. Attorney
Leslie Osborne did not even mention the fictitious armed uprising that
was supposed to be under way in Waimanalo. His major points of
51. This theory has been advanced by Williamson Chang of the William S. Richardson School of
Law. Cf. Williamson B.C. Chang, The "Wastelaad" in the Western Exploitatior of "Race" and the
Environment, 63 U. Colo. L. Rev. 849, 852, 858, 860 (1992) (discussing the wholly different world-
view of traditional Hawaiian thought and the centrality of relationships with land to that view).
52. 18 U.S.C. § 1071 (1994) makes it a crime to "harboro or concealo any person for whose
arrest a warrant or process has been issued under the provisions of any law of the United States, so
as to prevent his discovery and arrest .... " For an example of "harboring" analysis, see United
States v. Foy, 416 F.2d 940 (7th Cir. 1969). For a discussion of the term "harbor" in the context of
Anti-Alien Harboring Statutes, see Gregory A. Loken & Lisa R. Babino, Harboring, Sanctuary and
the Crime of Charity Under Federal Immigration Law, 28 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 119, 141-48
(1993).
53. See supra note 25.
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concern were Kanahele's "antisocial" past and the great risks "of serious
injury and even death" that ensued when the police stopped the Kanahele
group on the Kamehameha highway in an attempt to arrest Nathan
Brown. That this "public danger" was the work of the authorities and not
Kanahele did not escape the notice of Judge Ezra, who finally ordered
the defendant's release, subject to a number of onerous conditions (spend
the nights in a half-way house provided he pays for the service, stay
away from Waimanalo) that were supposed to assure his appearance at
the next trial. 4
D. Reciprocity, the Question of Honor, Embarrassment and
Provocation
One expects the sense of justice to go to work against gross
reciprocity lapses but most observers would be surprised that omissions
of this sort can keep the offender in jail. The government's brief to the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in support of the detention order (that is,
the bail denial) tells this version of negotiations between Kanahele and
the Assistant Chief of the Honolulu Police Department over arrest
warrants growing out of the refusal of some members of the sovereignty
movement to carry state issued license plates on their vehicles:
The defendant and his associates agreed to settle their outstanding
warrants and take care of the sovereignty plate problem. However,
the defendant and his associates simply reneged on their
commitments to the Chief and other law enforcement officials ....
After the defendant breached the agreement with [the Chief], it
became necessary to arrest the defendant's followers on those State
warrants. When the arrest began, Kanahele contacted the Police
Department and threatened to either "crack" or "whack" Honolulu
Police officers if they proceeded with their efforts.... Eventually,
defendant did apologize for his inflammatory language.5
Thus, the defendant "cannot be trusted to keep his word" and the incident
"shows the illusory nature of this defendant's promises. 56 The record "is
replete with the defendant's contempt for the court and his refusal to
honor his word to law enforcement."57
54. See Hosek, supra note 18, at Al.
55. U.S. Brief on Appeal from Detention Order, supra note 8, at 7-8.




There was another score to settle-that is, the political embarrassment
stemming from the Makapuu Point Lighthouse takeover:
The defendant and others had settled on state property and claimed
it as their own. The State of Hawaii, Department of Land and
Natural Resources had called upon the Honolulu Police Department
to evict the trespassers. The trespassers and this defendant simply
refused to obey law enforcement officers who were in the lawful
discharge of their duty."
These incidents support another view of the Kanahele case, namely,
that it represents opportunity to even the score on a person whose
conduct had embarrassed and provoked officialdom, to the point of loss
of reputation. Kanahele had engineered the takeover of the Makapuu
Lighthouse a few years earlier, and had walked away a political winner.
He had encouraged scofflaw policies of refusing to carry state-issued
drivers' licenses and to display license plates. He had negotiated a
warrant settlement with the Assistant Chief of Police, and had not
honored the settlement. And now, after serving his notices, he was heard
to "brag" about how he had prevented the authorities from arresting
Nathan Brown.59
That there are no crimes of impudence, bragging, intentional infliction
of embarrassment on public officials, or disdain for process is but a
tactical and temporary limitation. Conduct that leads to strong official
resentment can inspire imaginative searches for some other charge that
might suffice to teach the requisite lesson.
V. CONCLUSION
The Kanahele case is a shining example of the sense ofjustice at work
in human affairs. Kanahele was prosecuted because he threatened the
authorities, defected from the group, offended the elite, alienated his
peers, and tarnished the reputations of officials. But what makes the U.S.
courts the envy of the world is that people who come there expect to see
justice happen. The same sense of justice that drove this case can be
turned on its managers, and what do we find? Trumped-up charges and
self-deceptions by a bunch of nervous authorities who are protecting
their status and reputations by manipulating the laws of the greatest
democracy the world has ever seen.
58. Id. at 4.
59. Id. at 1.
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APPENDIX: NATION OF HAWAI'I WAR CRIMES NOTICE*
Notice is herein given to you that, you have made yourselves
personally liable for war crimes and war crimes against humanity.
Your acts show contempt towards the Kanaka Maoli People and
the international obligations of the world. Your [ ] violation of the
rights of the Kanaka Maoli People and our Government in full
knowledge of those rights and process of restoration of our inherent
sovereignty, traditions and culture, shows your intent to separate
the Kanaka Maoli people and their lawful government.
This document, inclusive of exhibit "A", the Legal Foundation
of Hawai'i, the Hawai'i Constitution, The Convention on the Non-
Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes
Against Humanity, the International Convention on the
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid and the
Principles of international co-operation in the detection, arrest,
extradition and punishment of persons guilty of war crimes and
crimes against humanity, is prima facie evidence of your full
knowledge and participation in the direct murder and extermination
of the Kanaka Maoli People and their Government.
In the future, you shall be sought out, arrested and imprisoned,
to be brought before an international Criminal Tribunal to answer
for your participation in crimes of Apartheid and Genocide.
There will be no appeal.
Judgment will be final.
/signed/ Maltbie Napoleon
Hawai'i Attorney General
* Transcribed from letter of June 20, 1995, bearing "Nation of Hawai'i" letterhead and signed by
Maltbie Napoleon, Nation of Hawai'i Attorney General.

